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An Unknown Input Multi-Observer Approach for
Estimation and Control under Adversarial Attacks
Tianci Yang, Carlos Murguia, Margreta Kuijper, and Dragan Nesˇic´
Abstract—We address the problem of state estimation, attack
isolation, and control of discrete-time linear time-invariant sys-
tems under (potentially unbounded) actuator and sensor false
data injection attacks. Using a bank of unknown input observers,
each observer leading to an exponentially stable estimation
error (in the attack-free case), we propose an observer-based
estimator that provides exponential estimates of the system state
in spite of actuator and sensor attacks. Exploiting sensor and
actuator redundancy, the estimation scheme is guaranteed to
work if a sufficiently small subset of sensors and actuators are
under attack. Using the proposed estimator, we provide tools for
reconstructing and isolating actuator and sensor attacks; and a
control scheme capable of stabilizing the closed-loop dynamics by
switching off isolated actuators. Simulation results are presented
to illustrate the performance of our tools.
Index Terms—Unknown input observers, cyber-physical sys-
tems, sensor and actuator attacks, linear systems, control.
I. INTRODUCTION
Networked Control Systems (NCSs) have received consider-
able attention in recent years due to their numerous advantages
(e.g., reduced weight, volume and installation costs, and
better maintainability) when compared with traditional control
systems where sensors and actuators communicate through
point-to-point (wired) links. Networked Control Systems are
being used in many engineering applications, e.g., energy,
transportation, military, health care, and manufacturing. With
the growth of NCSs, new security challenges have become
an important issue as wireless communication networks in-
creasingly serve as new access points for adversaries trying
to disrupt the process. Cyber-physical attacks on NCSs have
caused substantial damage to a number of engineering systems.
A well-known example is the StuxNet virus that targeted
Siemens’ supervisory control and data acquisition systems.
Another example is the false data injection attacks on power
systems [1]. A more recent incident happend in 2014, where
the computers of a German steel mill were hacked and a
destruction of a blast furnace was caused. These and many
other recent incidents show that tools to identify and deal with
attacks on NCSs are needed.
In [2]-[12], various security and privacy problems for linear
control systems have been addressed and solved. In general,
analysis (synthesis) tools are proposed to quantify (minimize)
the performance degradation induced by different classes of
attacks, e.g., false-data-injection, replay, zero dynamics, and
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denial-of-service. There are also some results addressing the
nonlinear case. The problem of state estimation for nonlinear
power systems under sensor attacks is solved in [13] by using
compressed sensing technique. In [14], the authors address
the problem of sensor attack detection and state estimation
for uniformly observable continuous-time nonlinear systems.
In [15], Satisfiability Modulo Theory (SMT) solvers are used
for state estimation for nonlinear differentially flat systems
with corrupted sensors. In our previous work [16], [17],
the problem of state estimation and attack isolation for a
class of nonlinear systems with positive-slope nonlinearities
is considered. Similar to the ideas given in [18], we provided
an observer-based estimation/isolation strategy, using a bank
of circle-criterion observers, which provides a robust estimate
of the system state in spite of sensor attacks and effectively
pinpoints attacked sensors. Most of the existing work assume
actuators to be healthy and only consider sensor attacks. There
are only a few results dealing with attacked actuators. For
instance, in [19], the authors study the effect of actuator attacks
on the performance of linear quadratic regulators. In [20] and
[21], the problem of state estimation under sensor and actuator
attacks is addressed using compressed sensing ideas and SMT-
based techniques, respectively. An adaptive control scheme
that guarantees uniform ultimate boundedness of the closed-
loop dynamics despite of sensor and actuator attacks is given
in [22].
The core of our estimation scheme is inspired by the work in
[11], where the problem of state estimation for continuous-time
LTI systems is addressed. The authors propose a multi-observer
estimator, using a bank of Luenberger observers, that provides
a robust estimate of the system state in spite of sensor attacks.
In this manuscript, using banks of Unknown Input Observers
(UIOs), we address the problem of robust state estimation, at-
tack isolation, and control for discrete-time LTI systems (with
matrices (A,B,C)) under (potentially unbounded) actuator
and sensor attacks. Unknown input observers are dynamical
systems capable of estimating the state of the plant without
using any input signals. If such an observer exists for the
matrices (A,B, C˜i), where C˜i denotes a submatrix of C with
fewer rows and the same number of columns, then, using
a bank of observers, we can perform state estimation and
attack isolation when a sufficiently small subset of sensors
is attacked (even if all inputs are under attack). The main
idea behind our multi-observer estimator is the following. Each
UIO in the bank is constructed using a triple (A,B, C˜i), i.e.,
the i-th observer is driven by the output signals associated
with C˜i only. If the outputs corresponding to C˜i are attack-
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free, this UIO produces an exponentially stable estimation
error. For every pair of UIOs in the bank, we compute the
largest difference between their estimates. Then, we select the
pair leading to the smallest difference and prove that these
observers reconstruct the state of the system exponentially. If
a UIO does not exist for (A,B, C˜i), but it does for (A, B˜i, C˜i),
where B˜i is a submatrix ofB with fewer columns and the same
number of rows, i.e., the i-th observer does not use the input
signals associated with B˜i, but it does use the remaining input
signals and the output signals corresponding to C˜i, then using
a bank of these UIOs, we can use similar ideas to perform state
estimation and attack isolation at the price of only being able
to isolate when a sufficiently small subset of actuators and
sensors are under attack. If the inputs corresponding to B˜i
include all the attacked ones and the outputs corresponding
to C˜i are attack-free, this UIO produces exponentially stable
estimation error. For every pair of UIOs in the bank, we
compute the largest difference between their estimates and
select the pair leading to the smallest difference. We prove
that these observers provide exponential estimate of the system
state. Once we have an estimate of the state, we provide
tools for reconstructing attack signals using model matching
techniques. Attacked actuators and sensors are isolated by
simply checking the sparsity of the estimated attack signals.
Finally, after obtaining state estimates and isolation has been
performed, we provide a control scheme for stabilizing the
closed-loop dynamics. In the case with sensor attacks only
(no actuators attacks), we show that a separation principle
between estimation and control holds and the system can be
stabilized by closing the loop with the multi-observer estimator
and a static output feedback controller. When both sensors
and actuator are attacks, we propose an effective technique to
stabilize the system by switching off the isolated actuators,
and closing the loop with a multi-observer based output time-
varying feedback controller. Because attack signals might be
zero for some time instants, actuators isolated as attack-
free might arbitrarily switch among all the supersets of the
set of attack-free actuators. Therefore, we need a controller
able to stabilize the closed-loop dynamics under the arbitrary
switching induced by turning off the isolated actuators. To
achieve this, we assume that a state feedback controller that
stabilizes the switching closed-loop system exists, and use
this controller together with the multi-observer estimator to
stabilize the system. We use Input-to-State Stability (ISS) [23]
of the closed-loop system with respect to the exponentially
stable estimation error to conclude on stability of the closed-
loop dynamics. Compared to the adaptive controller proposed
in [22], where a particular class of attacks is considered and
ultimate boundedness of the closed-loop system is guaranteed
only, our controller is able drive the system state asymptoti-
cally to the origin under arbitrary and potentially unbounded
attack signals.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present
some preliminary results needed for the subsequent sections.
In Section 3, we introduce the proposed UIO-based estimation
schemes. In Section 4, a method for isolating actuator attacks
is described. The proposed control scheme is given in Section
V. Finally, in Section 6, we give concluding remarks.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Notation
We denote the set of real numbers by R, the set of natural
numbers by N , the set of integers by Z, and Rn×m the set
of n×m matrices for any m,n ∈ N. For any vector v ∈ Rn,
we denote vJ the stacking of all vi, i ∈ J , J ⊂ {1, . . . , n},
|v| =
√
v⊤v, and supp(v) = {i ∈ {1, . . . , n} |vi 6= 0}. For
matrices C ∈ Rp×n, C⊤ = (c⊤1 , . . . , c⊤p ), we denote CJ the
stacking of all rows ci ∈ R1×n, i ∈ J , J ⊂ {1, . . . , n}. Set
J is called a superset of set S if S ⊆ J . We denote the
cardinality of a set S as card(S). The binomial coefficient is
denoted as
(
a
b
)
, where a, b are nonnegative integers. We denote
a variable m uniformly distributed in the interval (z1, z2) as
m ∼ U(z1, z2) and normally distributed with mean µ and
variance σ2 as m ∼ N (µ, σ2). The notation 0n and In denote
the zero matrix and the identity matrix of dimension n × n,
respectively. We simply write 0 and I when their dimensions
are evident. A continuous function α : [0, a)→ [0,∞) is said
to belong to class K, if it is strictly increasing and α(0) = 0,
[24]. Similarity, a continuous function β : [0, a) × [0,∞) →
[0,∞) is said to belong to class KL if, for fixed s, the mapping
β(r, s) belongs to class K with respect to r and, for fixed
r, the mapping β(r, s) is decreasing with respect to s and
β(r, s)→ 0 as s→∞, [24].
III. ESTIMATION
In [18], the problem of state estimation for continuous-time
LTI system under sensor attacks is solved using a bank of
Luenberger observers. Inspired by these results, we use a bank
of UIOs to estimate the state of the system when sensor and
actuator attacks both occur. Consider a discrete-time linear
system under sensor and actuator attacks:{
x+ =Ax+B(u+ au)
y =Cx+ ay
(1)
with state x ∈ Rn, output y ∈ Rny , known input u ∈ Rnu ,
vector of actuator attacks au ∈ Rnu , au = (au1, . . . , aunu)⊤,
i.e., aui(k) = 0 for all k ≥ 0 if the i-th actuator is attack-
free; otherwise, aui(ki) 6= 0 for some ki ≥ 0 and can be
arbitrarily large, and vector of sensor attacks ay ∈ Rny , ay =
(ay1, . . . , ayny)
⊤, i.e., ayi(k) = 0 for all k ≥ 0 if the i-
th sensor is attack-free; otherwise, ayi(ki) 6= 0 for some
ki ≥ 0 and can be arbitrarily large. Matrices A,B,C are
of appropriate dimensions, and we assume that (A,B) is
stabilizable, (A,C) is detectable, and B has full column rank.
Let Wu ⊂ {1, . . . , nu} denotes the unknown set of attacked
actuators, and Wy ⊂ {1, . . . , ny} denotes the unknown set of
attacked sensors.
Assumption 1 The sets of attacked actuators and sensors
do not change over time, i.e., Wu ⊂ {1, . . . , nu} ,Wy ⊂
{1, . . . , ny} are constant (time-invariant) and supp(au(k)) ⊆
Wu, supp(ay(k)) ⊆Wy , for all k ≥ 0.
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A. Complete Unknown Input Observers
We first treat (u + au) as an unknown input to system (1)
and consider a UIO with the following structure:{
z+Js =NJszJs + LJsy
Js ,
xˆJs =zJs + EJsy
Js ,
(2)
where zJs ∈ Rn is the state of the observer, xˆJs ∈ Rn denotes
the estimate of the system state, (NJs , LJs , EJs) are observer
matrices of appropriate dimensions to be designed. It is easy to
verify that if (NJs , LJs , EJs) satisfy the following equations:{
NJs(I − EJsCJs) + LJsCJs + (EJsCJs − I)A =0,
(EJsC
Js − I)B =0; (3)
then, the estimation error eJs = xˆJs − x satisfies:
e+Js = NJseJs . (4)
If NJs is Schur, system (2) is called a UIO for (1). In [25], it
is proved that such observer exists if and only if the following
two conditions are satisfied:
(c1) rank(C
JsB) = rank(B) = nu.
(c2) The pair (C
Js , A− EJsCJsA) is detectable.
Let q be the largest integer such that for all Js ⊂
{1, . . . , ny} with card(Js) ≥ ny − 2q > 0, conditions (c1)
and (c2) are satisfied; then, observer (2) can be constructed
for any CJs with card(Js) ≥ ny − 2q by solving (3) for a
Schur matrix NJs . Hence, for such an observer, if a
Js
y (k) = 0
for all k ≥ 0, there exist cJs > 0, λJs ∈ (0, 1) satisfying:
|eJs(k)| ≤ cJsλkJs |eJs(0)|, (5)
for all k ≥ 0 [25], where eJs = xˆJs − x.
Assumption 2 There are at most q sensors attacked by an
adversary, i.e.,
card(Wy) ≤ q < ny
2
, (6)
where q is the largest positive integer satisfying conditions
(c1) and (c2).
Lemma 1 Under Assumption 2, among each set of ny − q
sensors, at least ny − 2q > 0 of them are attack-free.
Proof: Lemma 1 follows trivially from Assumption 2. 
Let Assumption 2 be satisfied. Inspired by the ideas in [11],
we use a UIO for each subset Js ⊂ {1, . . . , ny} of sensors
with card(Js) = ny−q and for each subset Ss ⊂ {1, . . . , ny}
of sensors with card(Ss) = ny − 2q. Under Assumption 2,
there exists at least one set J¯s ⊂ {1, . . . , ny} with card(J¯s) =
ny − q such that aJsy (k) = 0 for all k ≥ 0. Then, the estimate
given by the UIO for J¯s is a correct estimate, and the estimate
given by the UIO for any Ss ⊂ J¯s with card(Ss) = ny−2q is
consistent with that given by J¯s. This motivates the following
estimation strategy.
For each set Js with card(Js) = ny − q, we define piJs(k)
as the largest deviation between xˆJs and xˆSs that is given by
any Ss ⊂ Js with card(Ss) = ny − 2q, i.e.,
piJs(k) := max
Ss⊂Js:card(Ss)=ny−2q
|xˆJs(k)− xˆSs(k)|, (7)
for all k ≥ 0, and the sequence σs(k) as
σs(k) := argmin
Js⊂{1,...,ny}:card(Js)=ny−q
piJs(k). (8)
Then, as proved below, the estimate indexed by σs(k):
xˆ(k) := xˆσs(k)(k), (9)
is an exponential attack-free estimate of the system state. For
simplicity and without generality, for all Js and Ss, zJs(0)
and zSs(0) are chosen such that xˆJs(0) = xˆSs(0) = xˆ(0).
The following result summarizes the ideas presented above.
Theorem 1 Consider system (1), observer (2), and the com-
plete multi-observer estimator (7)-(9). Define the estimation
error e(k) := xˆσs(k)(k) − x(k), and let conditions (c1)-(c2)
and Assumptions 1-2 be satisfied; then, there exist constants
c¯ > 0, λ¯ ∈ (0, 1) satisfying:
|e(k)| ≤ c¯λ¯k|e(0)|, (10)
for all e(0) ∈ Rn, k ≥ 0.
Proof: Under Assumption 2, there exists at least one set J¯s
with card(J¯s) = ny − q such that aJ¯sy (k) = 0 for all k ≥ 0.
Then, there exist cJ¯s > 0 and λJ¯s ∈ (0, 1) such that
|eJ¯s(k)| ≤ cJ¯sλkJ¯s |e(0)|, (11)
for all e(0) ∈ Rn and k ≥ 0. Moreover, for any set Ss ⊂ J¯s
with card(Ss) = ny−2q, we have aSsy (k) = 0 ∀k ≥ 0; hence,
there exist cSs > 0 and λSs ∈ (0, 1) such that
|eSs(k)| ≤ cSsλkSs |e(0)|, (12)
for all e(0) ∈ Rn and k ≥ 0. Consider piJs in (7). Combining
the above inequalities, we have
piJ¯s(k) = max
Ss⊂J¯s
|xˆJ¯s(k)− xˆSs(k)|
=max
Ss⊂J¯s
|xˆJ¯s(k)− x(k) + x(k) − xˆSs(k)|
≤|eJ¯s(k)|+ max
Ss⊂J¯s
|eSs(k)|
≤2c′
J¯s
λ
′k
J¯s
|e(0)|,
(13)
for all e(0) ∈ Rn and k ≥ 0, where
c′
J¯s
:= max
Ss⊂J¯s
{
cJ¯s , cSs
}
,
λ′
J¯s
:= max
Ss⊂J¯s
{
λJ¯s , λSs
}
.
Note that Ss ⊂ J¯s, card(Ss) = ny − 2q2. Then, from (8), we
have piσs(k)(k) ≤ piJ¯s(k). From Lemma 1, we know that there
exist at least one set S¯s ⊂ σs(k) with card(S¯s) = ny − 2q,
such that aS¯sy (k) = 0 for all k ≥ 0, and there exist cS¯s > 0
and λS¯s ∈ (0, 1) such that
|eS¯s(k)| ≤ cS¯sλkS¯s |e(0)|, (14)
for all e(0) ∈ Rn and k ≥ 0. From (7), we have
piσs(k)(k) = max
Ss⊂σs(k)
|xˆσs(k)(k)− xˆSs(k)|
≥|xˆσs(k)(k)− xˆS¯s(k)|.
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Fig. 1. Estimated states xˆ converges to the true states x when au, ay3 ∼
U(−10, 10). Legend: xˆ (blue), true states (black)
Using this lower bound on piσs(k)(k) and the triangle inequal-
ity we have that
|eσs(k)(k)| =|xˆσs(k)(k)− x(k)|
=|xˆσs(k)(k)− xˆS¯s(k) + xˆS¯s(k)− x(k)|
≤|xˆσs(k)(k)− xˆS¯s(k)|+ |eS¯s(k)|
≤piσs(k)(k) + |eS¯s(k)|
≤piJ¯s(k) + |eS¯s(k)|,
(15)
for all k ≥ 0. Hence, from (13) and (14), we have
|eσs(k)(k)| ≤ c¯λ¯k|e(0)|, (16)
for all e(0) ∈ Rn and k ≥ 0, where c¯ = 3max{cS¯s , c′J¯s} and
λ¯ = max{λS¯s , λ′J¯s}. Inequality (16) is of the form (10) and
the result follows. 
Example 1: Consider the following system subject to actuator
and sensor attacks:

x+ =
[
0.2 0.5
0.2 0.7
]
x+
[
1
2
]
(u+ au),
y =


1 3
1 1
3 2
2 1

x+ ay.
(17)
It can be verified that a UIO of the form (2) exists for each
CJs with Js ⊂ {1, 2, 3, 4} and card(Js) ≥ 2; then, 4−2q = 2,
i.e., q = 1 and at most one sensor is attacked. We attack the
actuator and let Wy = {3}, i.e., the third sensor is attacked.
We let u ∼ U(−1, 1), au, ay3 ∼ U(−10, 10). We design a
UIO for each Js with card(Js) = 3, and for each Ss with
card(Ss) = 2. Therefore, totally
(
4
3
)
+
(
4
2
)
= 10 UIOs are
designed and they are all initialized at xˆ(0) = [0, 0]
⊤
. For
k ∈ [0, 19], the estimator (2), (26)-(28) is used to construct
xˆ(k). The performance of the estimator is shown in Figure 1.
B. Partial Unknown Input Observers
Here, we are implicitly assuming that either condition
(c1) or (c2) (or both) cannot be satisfied for any C
Js with
card(Js) = ny − 2q with q ≥ 1. Let B be partitioned as
B = [b1, . . . , bi, . . . , bnu ] where bi ∈ Rn×1 is the i-th column
of B. Then, the attacked system (1) can be written as{
x+ =Ax +Bu+ bWua
Wu ,
y =Cx + ay,
(18)
where the attack input aWu can be regarded as an unknown
input and the columns of bWu are bi, i ∈ Wu. Denote by bJu
the matrix whose columns are bi for i ∈ Ju. Let q1 and q2 be
the largest integers such that for all Ju ⊂ {1, . . . , nu} with
card(Ju) ≤ 2q1 < nu and Js ⊂ {1, . . . , ny} with card(Js) ≥
ny − 2q2 > 0, the following is satisfied:
(c3) rank(C
JsbJu) = rank(bJu) = card(Ju).
(c4) There exists (NJus , LJus , EJus , TJus) satisfying:

NJus(I − EJusCJs) + LJusCJs + (EJusCJs − I)A =0,
(TJus + EJusC
Js − I)B =0,
(EJusC
Js − I)bJu =0,
(19)
with detectable pair (CJus , A−EJusCJusA) and Schur NJus .
If conditions (c3) and (c4) are satisfied, a UIO with the
following structure exists for each bJu with Ju ⊂ {1, . . . , nu},
card(Ju) ≤ 2q1 < nu and each CJs with Js ⊂ {1, . . . , ny},
card(Js) ≥ ny − 2q2 > 0:{
z+Jus =NJuszJus + TJusBu+ LJusy
Js ,
xˆJus =zJus + EJusy
Js ,
(20)
where zJus ∈ Rn is the observer state, xˆJus denotes the
state estimate, and (NJus , LJus , TJus , EJus) are the observer
matrices satisfying (19), see [25] for further details. That is,
system (20) is a UIO for the system:{
x+ =Ax+Bu+ bJua
Ju
u ,
yJs =CJsx+ aJsy ,
(21)
with unknown input bJua
Ju and known input Bu. It follows
that the estimation error eJus = xˆJus − x satisfies:
e+Jus = NJuseJus , (22)
for some Schur matrix NJus . We refer to UIOs of the form
(21) as partial UIOs for the pair (Ju, Js).
Assumption 3 There are at most q1 actuators and at most q2
sensors attacked by an adversary, i.e.,
card(Wu) ≤ q1 < nu
2
(23)
card(Wy) ≤ q2 < ny
2
, (24)
where q1 and q2 are the largest positive integers satisfying
(c3) and (c4).
Remark 1 Note that if conditions (c3) and (c4) are satisfied
for bJu with card(Ju) = 2q1 = nu, then conditions (c1) and
(c2) are satisfied, and (20) is a complete UIO for (1) for
TJus = 0. Since we are considering partial UIOs, we assume
2q1 < nu to exclude this case.
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Lemma 2 Under Assumption 3, for each set of q1 actuators,
among all its supersets with 2q1 actuators, at least one set is
a superset of Wu.
Lemma 3 Under Assumption 3, among each set of ny − q2
sensors, at least ny − 2q2 > 0 sensors are attack-free.
Proof: Lemmas 2 and 3 follow trivially from Assumption 3.

Note that the existence of a UIO for each pair (Ju, Js)
with card(Ju) ≤ 2q1 and card(Js) ≥ ny − 2q2 means that if
Wu ⊆ Ju and aJsy (k) = 0 for all k ≥ 0, the estimation error
eJus = xˆJus − x satisfies
|eJus | ≤ cJusλkJus |eJus(0)|, (25)
for some cJus > 0 and λJus ∈ (0, 1), all eJus(0) ∈ Rn,
and k ≥ 0. Let Assumption 3 be satisfied. We use a UIO
for each pair (Ju, Js) with card(Ju) = q1 and card(Js) =
ny − q2. Then, we use a UIO for each pair (Su, Ss) with
Su ⊂ {1, . . . , nu}, card(Su) = 2q1 and Ss ⊂ {1, . . . , ny},
card(Ss) = ny − 2q2. Under Assumption 3 , there exists at
least one set J¯u with card(J¯u) = q1 such that Wu ⊆ J¯u
and at least one set J¯s with card(J¯s) = ny − q2 such that
aJ¯sy (k) = 0 for all k ≥ 0. Then, the estimate given by the UIO
for (J¯u, J¯s) is a correct estimate, and the estimates given by
the UIOs for any (Su, Ss) (denoted as xˆSus), where Su ⊃ J¯u,
card(Su) = 2q1 and Ss ⊂ J¯s, card(Js) = ny − 2q2, are
consistent with xˆJus . This motivates the following estimation
strategy.
For each pair (Ju, Js) with card(Ju) = q1 and card(Js) =
ny − q2, define piJus(k) as the largest deviation between
xˆJus(k) and xˆSus(k) that is given by any pair (Su, Ss),
where Su ⊃ Ju with card(Su) = 2q1 and Ss ⊂ Js with
card(Ss) = ny − 2q2. That is,
piJus(k) := max
Su⊃Ju,Ss⊂Js
|xˆJus(k)− xˆSus(k)|, (26)
for all k ≥ 0. Define the sequences σu(k) and σs(k) as
(σu(k), σs(k)) := argmin
Ju,Js
piJus(k). (27)
Then, as proven below, the estimate indexed by (σu(k), σs(k)):
xˆ(k) = xˆσus(k)(k), (28)
is an exponential attack-free estimate of the system state. For
simplicity and without generality, for all J and S, zJus(0) and
zSus(0) are chosen such that xˆJus(0) = xˆSus(0) = xˆ(0). The
following result summarizes the ideas presented above.
Theorem 2 Consider system (1), observer (20), and the par-
tial multi-observer estimator (26)-(28). Define the estimation
error e(k) := xˆσus(k)(k) − x(k) and let (c3)-(c4) and As-
sumptions 1,3 be satisfied; then, there exist positive constants
c¯ > 0 and λ¯ ∈ (0, 1) satisfying:
|e(k)| ≤ c¯λ¯k|e(0)|, (29)
for all e(0) ∈ Rn, k ≥ 0.
Proof: Under Assumption 3, there exists at least one set J¯u
with card(J¯) = q1 such that J¯u ⊃Wu, and at least one set J¯s
with card(J¯s) = ny − q2 such that aJ¯sy (k) = 0 for all k ≥ 0;
then, there exist cJ¯us > 0 and λJ¯us ∈ (0, 1) satisfying
|eJ¯us(k)| ≤ cJ¯usλkJ¯us |e(0)|, (30)
for all e(0) ∈ Rn and k ≥ 0. Moreover, for any set Su ⊃ J¯u
with card(Su) = 2q1 and Ss ⊂ J¯s with card(Ss) = ny−2q2,
we have Su ⊃Wu and aSsy (k) = 0 for all k ≥ 0; hence, there
exist cSus > 0 and λSus ∈ (0, 1) such that
|eSus(k)| ≤ cSusλkSus |e(0)|, (31)
for all e(0) ∈ Rn and k ≥ 0. Consider piJ¯us in (26).
Combining the above results, we have that
piJ¯us(k) = max
Su⊃J¯u,Ss⊂J¯s
|xˆJ¯us(k)− xˆSus(k)|
= max
Su⊃J¯u,Ss⊂J¯s
|xˆJ¯us(k)− x(k) + x(k)− xˆSus(k)|
≤ |eJ¯us(k)|+ max
Su⊃J¯u,Ss⊂J¯s
|eSus(k)|,
for all k ≥ 0. From (30) and (31), we obtain
piJ¯us(k) ≤ 2c′J¯usλ
′k
J¯us
|e(0)|, (32)
for all e(0) ∈ Rn and k ≥ 0, where
c′
J¯us
:= max
Su⊃J¯u,Ss⊂J¯s
{
cJ¯us , cSus
}
,
λ′
J¯us
:= max
Su⊃J¯u,Ss⊂J¯s
{
λJ¯us , λSus
}
.
Note that Su ⊃ J¯u, card(Ju) = 2q1, and Ss ⊂ J¯s, card(Ss) =
ny − 2q2. Then, from (27), we have piσus(k)(k) ≤ piJ¯us(k).
By Lemmas 2 and 3, we know that there exists at least one
set S¯u ⊃ σu(k) with card(S¯u) = 2q1 and at least one set
S¯s ⊂ σs(k) with card(S¯s) = ny − 2q1 such that S¯u ⊃ Wu
and aS¯sy (k) = 0 for all k ≥ 0. Hence, there exist cS¯us > 0
and λS¯us ∈ (0, 1) satisfying
|eS¯us(k)| ≤ cS¯usλkS¯us |e(0)|, (33)
for all e(0) ∈ Rn and k ≥ 0. From (26), by construction
piσus(k)(k) = max
Su⊃σu(k),Ss⊂σs(k)
|xˆσus(k)(k)− xˆSus(k)|
≥|xˆσus(k)(k)− xˆS¯us(k)|.
Using the above lower bound on piσus(k)(k) and the triangle
inequality, we have that
|eσus(k)(k)| =|xˆσus(k)(k)− x(k)|
=|xˆσus(k)(k)− xˆS¯us(k) + xˆS¯us(k)− x(k)|
≤|xˆσus(k)(k)− xˆS¯us(k)|+ |eS¯us(k)|
≤piσus(k)(k) + |eS¯us(k)|
≤piJ¯us(k) + |eS¯us(k)|,
(34)
for all k ≥ 0. Hence, from (32) and (33), we have
|eσus(k)(k)| ≤ c¯λ¯k|e(0)|, (35)
for all e(0) ∈ Rn and k ≥ 0, where c¯ = 3max{cS¯us , c′J¯us},
λ¯ = max{λS¯us , λ′J¯us}. Inequality (35) is of the form (29), and
the result follows. 
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Fig. 2. Estimated states xˆ converges to the true states x when au3, ay2 ∼
U(−10, 10). Legend: xˆ (blue), true states (black)
Example 2: Consider a linear system subject to actuator and
sensor attacks:

x+ =

0.5 0 0.10.2 0.7 0
1 0 0.3

x+

0.5 0 0.51 1 0.1
0 0 0.5

 (u+ au),
y =


1 2 0
0 1 1
0 1 2
1 1 1

x+ ay.
(36)
It can be verified that complete UIOs do not exist for any
CJs with card(Js) ≤ 2. However, a partial UIO exists for
each pair (Ju, Js) with card(Ju) ≤ 2 and card(Js) ≥ 2;
then, 2q1 = 2 and 4 − 2q2 = 2, i.e., q1 = q2 = 1. We
let Wu = {3}, Wy = {2}, i.e., the third actuator and the
second sensor are attacked, u ∼ U(−1, 1), and au3, ay2 ∼
U(−10, 10). We construct a partial UIO for each pair (Ju, Js)
with card(Ju) = 1, card(Js) = 3 and each set (Su, Ss) with
card(Su) = 2, card(Ss) = 2. Therefore, totally
(
3
1
) × (43) +(
3
2
) × (42) = 30 partial UIOs are designed. We initiate the
observers at xˆ(0) = [0, 0, 0]⊤. Estimator (20), (26)-(28) is
used to construct xˆ(k). The performance of the estimator is
shown in Figure 2.
IV. ATTACK ISOLATION AND RECONSTRUCTION
Once we have an estimate xˆ(k) of x(k), either using
the complete multi-observer estimator in Section III-A or
the partial multi-observer estimator in Section III-B, we can
use these estimates, the system model (1), and the known
inputs to exponentially reconstruct the attack signals. Note that
e = xˆ− x⇒ x = xˆ− e⇒ x+ = xˆ+ − e+. Then, the system
dynamics (1) can be written in terms of e and xˆ as follows:

xˆ+ = e+ +A(xˆ − e) +B(u + au),
⇓
au = B
−1
left(xˆ
+ −Axˆ)− u−B−1left(e+ −Ae),
(37)
because B has full column rank (as introduced in the system
description), where B−1left denotes the Moore-Penrose pseu-
doinverse of B. Similarly, we have

y = Cx+ ay = Cxˆ− Ce + ay,
⇓
ay = y − Cxˆ + Ce.
(38)
First, consider the complete multi-observer in Section III-A.
Let the estimation error dynamics characterized by (7)-(9) be
given by
e+ = f1(e, x, ay, au), (39)
where f1 : R
n × Rn × Rny × Rnu → Rn denotes some
nonlinear function. That is, the estimation error is given by
some nonlinear function of the state and the attack signals.
However, in Theorem 1, we have proved that e converges to
the origin exponentially. Hence, the terms depending on e and
e+ in the expression for au and ay in (37) and (38) vanishes
exponentially and therefore, the following attack estimate:
aˆu(k) = B
−1
left(xˆ(k)−Axˆ(k − 1))− u(k − 1), (40)
and
aˆy(k) = y(k)− Cxˆ(k), (41)
exponentially reconstruct the attack signals au(k − 1) and
ay(k), i.e.,
lim
k→∞
(aˆu(k)− au(k − 1)) = 0, (42)
and
lim
k→∞
(aˆy(k)− ay(k)) = 0. (43)
Then, for sufficiently large k, the sparsity pattern of aˆu(k) and
aˆy(k) can be used to isolate attacks, i.e.,
Wˆu(k) = supp(aˆu(k)), (44)
and
Wˆy(k) = supp(aˆy(k)), (45)
where Wˆu(k) denotes the set of isolated attacked actuators,
and Wˆy(k) denotes the set of isolated attacked sensors. Note
that we can only estimate au from xˆ
+ and e+, which implies
that we always have, at least, one-step delay for actuator
attacks isolation.
Next, consider the partial multi-observer estimator given in
Section III-B. In this case, the attack vector au and ay can also
be written as (37) and (38), and the estimation error dynamics
is given by some nonlinear difference equation characterized
by the estimator structure in (26)-(28). Let the estimation error
dynamics be given by
e+ = f2(e, x, ay, au), (46)
for some nonlinear function f2 : R
n×Rn×Rny×Rnu → Rn.
In Theorem 2, we have proved that e converges to the
origin exponentially. Hence, the attack estimate in (40) and
(41) exponentially reconstructs the attack signals. Again, the
sparsity pattern of aˆu(k) and aˆy(k) can be used to isolate
actuator and sensor attacks using (44) and (45).
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Fig. 3. Estimated actuator attacks aˆ+u converges to au when au, ay3 ∼
U(−10, 10). Legend: aˆ+u (blue), au (black).
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Fig. 4. Estimated sensor attacks aˆy converges to ay when au, ay3 ∼
U(−10, 10). Legend: aˆy (blue), ay (black).
Example 3: Consider system (17) and the complete multi-
observer estimator in Example 1. Let Wu = {1}, Wy = {3},
u ∼ U(−1, 1), au, ay2 ∼ U(−10, 10), and (x1(0), x2(0)) ∼
N (0, 12). We obtain aˆu(k) and aˆy(k) from (40) and (41).
The reconstructed attack signals are depicted in Figures 3-4.
By checking the sparsity of these signals, actuator and sensor
3 are isolated as attacked.
Example 4: Here we consider system (36) and the partial
multi-observer estimator in Example 2. Let Wu = {3},
Wy = {2}, (u1, u2, u3) ∼ U(−1, 1), au3, ay2 ∼ U(−10, 10),
and (x1(0), x2(0), x3(0)) ∼ N (0, 12). We obtain aˆu(k) and
aˆy(k) from (40) and (41). The reconstructed attacks are shown
in Figures 5-6. In this case, using sparsity of the estimated
attacks, actuator 3 and sensor 2 are correctly isolated.
V. CONTROL
In this section, we introduce a method to use the proposed
multi-observer estimators to asymptotically stabilize the sys-
tem dynamics.
A. Sensor attacks only
We first consider the case when only sensors are attacked
and actuators are attack-free. Then, the system is given by{
x+ =Ax+Bu,
y =Cx+ ay.
(47)
Let u = Kxˆ, where xˆ is the estimate given by the complete
multi-observer estimator in Section III-A or the partial multi-
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Fig. 5. Estimated actuator attacks aˆ+u converges to au when au3, ay2 ∼
U(−10, 10). Legend: aˆ+u (blue), au (black).
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Fig. 6. Estimated sensor attacks aˆy converges to ay when au3, ay2 ∼
U(−10, 10). aˆy (blue), ay (black).
observer estimator in Section III-B, and K is chosen such that
A+BK is Schur. Then, the closed-loop system is given by
x+ = Ax+BKxˆ, (48)
or in terms of the estimation error as
x+ =Ax+B(K(xˆ− x+ x)),
=(A+BK)x+BKe.
(49)
For the complete multi-observer estimator, let the estimation
error dynamics be given by
e+ =f1(e, x, ay), (50)
for some nonlinear function f1 : R
n × Rn × Rny → Rn. For
the partial multi-observer estimator, let the estimation error
dynamics be given by
e+ =f2(e, x, ay), (51)
for some nonlinear function f2 : R
n×Rn×Rny → Rn. Since
A+BK is Schur, the closed-loop dynamics (49) is Input-to-
State Stable (ISS) with respect to input e(k) and some linear
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Fig. 7. Controlled states when ay2 ∼ U(−10, 10).
gain, see [26]. Moreover, in Theorems 1 and 2, we have proved
that (50) and (51) are exponentially stable uniformly in x(k)
and ay(k). The latter and ISS of the system dynamics imply
that limk→∞ x(k) = 0 [26].
Example 5: Consider the open-loop unstable system

x+ =
[
1.2 0.5
0.2 0.7
]
x+
[
1 0
0 1
]
Kxˆ,
y =
[
1 1 3 2
3 1 2 1
]⊤
x+ ay.
(52)
It can be verified that a UIO of the form (2) exists for each
Js ⊂ {1, 2, 3, 4} with card(J2) ≥ 2; then, 4 − 2q = 2 and
q = 1. We let Wy = {2} and ay2 ∼ U(−10, 10). We construct(
4
3
)
+
(
4
2
)
= 10 UIOs initialized at xˆ(0) = [0, 0]
⊤
and let
K =
[−1.2 0.7
−0.2 −0.7
]
.
We use the complete multi-observer in Section III-A to esti-
mate the state. The state of the closed-loop system is shown
in Figure 7.
B. Sensor and actuator attacks
Here, we consider sensor and actuator attacks. We propose
a simple yet effective technique to stabilize the system by
switching off the isolated actuators, i.e., by removing the
columns of B that correspond to the isolated actuators, and
closing the loop with a multi-observer based output dynamic
feedback controller, see Figure 8. We introduce a switching
signal ρ(k) ⊆ {1, . . . nu}, containing the isolated attack-free
actuators, i.e., ρ(k) := {1, . . . , nu}\Wˆu(k). This ρ(k) is used
to denote actuators that are switched on. That is, ρ(k) = J if
the subset J ⊆ {1, . . . , nu} of actuators are switched on and
the remaining actuators are switched off at time k. Again, let
B be partitioned as B = [b1, . . . , bi, . . . , bnu ]. After switching
off the subset {1, . . . , nu} \ ρ(k) of actuators, system (1) is
written as follows{
x+ =Ax+ bρ(k)(u
ρ(k) + aρ(k)u ),
y =Cx+ ay,
(53)
Fig. 8. Estimation, isolation, and control diagram
where bρ(k) is the matrix whose columns are bi, i ∈ ρ(k), vec-
tors uρ(k) and a
ρ(k)
u are the inputs and attacks corresponding to
the switched-on actuators, respectively. We first consider the
case when the complete multi-observer estimator in Section
III-A exists, i.e., xˆ is generated by (7)-(9). We estimate aˆu(k)
using (40) and obtain Wˆu(k) from (44). Then, we switch
off the set Wˆu of actuators by letting ρ(k) = J¯(k) =
{1, . . . , nu} \ Wˆu(k). Since ai(k) = 0, i ∈ J¯(k), system (53)
has the following form:
x+ = Ax + bJ¯(k)u
J¯(k) (54)
where uJ¯(k) ∈ Rcard(J¯(k)) is the set of isolated attack-free
inputs. Let 0 < q⋆ < nu be the largest integer such that (A, bJ )
is stabilizable for each set J ⊂ {1, . . . , nu} with card(J) ≥
nu − q⋆ where bJ denotes a matrix whose columns are bi for
i ∈ J . We assume that at most q⋆ actuators are attacked. It
follows that nu − q⋆ ≤ card(J¯(k)) ≤ nu. We assume the
following.
Assumption 4 For any subset J with cardinality card(J) =
nu − q⋆, there exists a linear switching state feedback con-
troller uJ¯(k) = KJ¯(k)x such that the closed-loop dynamics:
x+ = (A+ bJ¯(k)KJ¯(k))x+ bJ¯(k)KJ¯(k)e, (55)
is ISS with input e for bJ¯(k) arbitrarily switching among all
bJ′ with J ⊂ J ′ ⊂ {1, . . . , nu} and nu−q⋆ ≤ card(J ′) ≤ nu.
Remark 2 We do not give a method for designing the linear
switching state feedback controller uJ¯(k) = KJ¯(k)x. Standard
results for designing switching controllers, for instance re-
sults in [27] and references therein, can be used to design
controllers satisfying Assumption 4.
By switching off the set Wˆu(k) of actuators at time k,
using the controller designed for the set J¯(k), and letting
uJ¯(k) = KJ¯(k)xˆ, the closed-loop system can be written as
(55) with estimation error e = xˆ − x generated by some
nonlinear difference equation (39). Because in Theorem 1,
we have proved that e(k) converges to zero exponentially
uniformly in x(k), ay(k) and au(k), the error e(k) in (55)
is a vanishing perturbation. Hence, under Assumption 4, it
follows that limk→∞ x(k) = 0.
Next, assume that a complete multi-observer estimator does
not exist but a partial multi-observer estimator exists (Section
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III-B), i.e., xˆ is generated from (26)-(28) and q1 ≤ q⋆. We as-
sume that at most q1 actuators are attacked. We construct xˆ(k)
from (26)-(28), estimate aˆu(k) using (40), and obtain Wˆu(k)
from (44). After switching off the set Wˆu(k) of actuators, the
system has the form (54) with nu − q1 ≤ card(J¯(k)) ≤ nu.
We assume the following.
Assumption 5 For any subset J with cardinality card(J) =
nu−q1, there exists a linear switching state feedback controller
uJ¯(k) = KJ¯(k)x such that the closed-loop dynamics (55) is
ISS with respect to e for bJ¯(k) arbitrarily switching among all
bJ′ with J ⊂ J ′ ⊂ {1, . . . , nu} and nu−q1 ≤ card(J ′) ≤ nu.
Using the controller designed for the set J¯(k), and letting
uJ¯(k) = KJ¯(k)xˆ, the closed-loop dynamics can be written
in the form (55). Then, in this case, e(k) is generated by
some nonlinear difference equation of the form (46). Under
Assumption 5, the closed-loop dynamics (55) is ISS with input
e(k), see [26]. Moreover, in Theorem 2, we have proved that
e(k) converges to the origin exponentially uniformly in x(k),
au(k) and ay(k). The latter and ISS of the system dynamics
imply that limk→∞ x(k) = 0 [26].
Example 6: Consider the following system:


x+ =

0.5 0 0.10.2 1.7 0
1 0 0.3

x+

0.5 0 11 1 1
0 0 1

 (u+ au),
y =


1 2 0
0 1 1
0 1 2
1 1 1

x+ ay.
(56)
Since (A, bi) is stabilizable for i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, we have q⋆ = 2.
It can be verified that there does not exist a complete UIO
for any Ss ⊂ {1, 2, 3, 4} with card(Ss) = 2, but partial
UIOs exists for each pair (Ju, Js) with card(Ju) ≤ 2 and
card(Js) ≥ 2; then, we have q1 = q2 = 1 and q1 < q⋆.
We let Wu = {3}, Wy = {2}, and au3, ay2 ∼ U(−10, 10).
We construct
(
3
1
) × (43) + (32) × (42) = 30 UIOs and use the
design method given in [27] to build controllers for actuators
{1, 2}, {1, 3}, {2, 3}, {1, 2, 3}. Then, we use the partial
multi-observer approach in Section III-B to estimate the state,
reconstruct the attack signals and control the system. The state
of the system is shown in Figure 9.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have addressed the problem of state estimation, attack
isolation, and control for discrete-time linear time-invariant
(LTI) systems under (potentially unbounded) actuator and
sensor false data injection attacks. Using a bank of Unknown
Input Observers (UIOs), we have proposed an estimator that
reconstructs the system states and the attack signals. We use
these estimates to isolate attacks and control the system. We
propose an effective technique to stabilize the system by
switching off the isolated actuators. Simulation results are
provided to illustrate our results.
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Fig. 9. State trjectories when au3, ay2 ∼ U(−10, 10).
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